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Robert Maynard Hutchins, who died at Santa Barbara, California,
on May 15, 1977, was Dean of the Yale Law School in 1928-29. He
had served as Secretary of Yale University from 1923 to 1927. Upon
his graduation from the Yale Law School in 1925, he joined the Law
School's faculty as a Lecturer, a position he held from 1925 to 1927.
He was Acting Dean of the Law School during the academic year
1927-28. Dean Hutchins was thirty years old when he left the Law
School to become President and later Chancellor of the University
of Chicago.
Dean Hutchins' active leadership in the field of legal education
during this brief span of years was notable for the innovations he
sponsored in the Law School's curriculum and in particular for the
establishment of the Institute of Human Relations. His erudition,
his inquisitive mind, and his theories of proper relationships among
law, economics, political science, and psychology left an indelible im-
print upon the Yale Law School of his time. His initiatives, more-
over, led to fruitful interdisciplinary research programs that have had
lasting effects upon legal education in this country.
The main endeavors of Dean Hutchins' career, and his publicly
known achievements, came in later years while he was a founder,
Chief Executive Officer, and President of the Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions, based in California. But many of the in-
gredients of his brilliant intellectual success first came to light during
his deanship at the Yale Law School. He himself believed that his
chief contribution as Dean of the Law School was the establishment
of the Yale Institute of Human Relations.' The purpose of the In-
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1. R. Hutchins, Report of the Dean 5 (1929).
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stitute, from the standpoint of the legal academics involved, was to
place law in proper perspective among the social sciences by studying
it in actual day-to-day operation. This method would take the study
of law outside the pronouncements of appellate courts. As part of this
program, several members of the Law School faculty affiliated them-
selves with the Institute, and representatives of the Yale Departments
of Economics, Sociology, and Government likewise participated in the
Institute's educational program. Among the first projects of the In-
stitute were the study of family factors in juvenile delinquency and
the study of the procedural, psychological, and sociological aspects
of crime.
2
Dean Hutchins' special interest in the activities of the Institute is
reflected in two of his articles, which were published in the Yale Law
Journal. One, published in 1928 and coauthored by Donald Slesinger,
was entitled Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-The Com-
petency of Witnesses.3 The article concludes with a typically confident
prediction regarding the integration of law and the social sciences:
We find therefore that under the present rules [regarding the
competency of witnesses], the trial judge often needlessly con-
sumes time at the trial, the litigants needlessly consume time and
money in appealing, and the appellate courts needlessly consume
time in reversing and remanding, after writing protracted opin-
ions about value abstractions to justify their action.
All these difficulties would be eliminated by the use of psy-
chological tests to determine competency . . ..
The other Hutchins article in the Journal is entitled Some Obser-
vations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind to Prove an Act,r also
coauthored with Donald Slesinger. The article further illustrates
Hutchins' research interests:
It is clear that something which lawyers call state of mind, the
very existence of which is denied by many respectable psycholo-
gists, is regarded as an integral part of the law . . . .The courts
do not attempt to define it; the text-writers rarely [do] .... Our
problem now is to ascertain to what psychological picture these
legal assumptions correspond and whether the two disciplines cast
any illumination upon each other.6
2. Id. at 5-6.
3. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-The Comipctency
of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928).
4. Id. at 1027.
5. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind to
Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283 (1929).
6. Id. at 291.
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Dean Hutchins was remarkably successful in strengthening the fac-
ulty of the Yale Law School. Aided by a revolt of Realists on the
faculty of the Columbia Law School in the late 1920s, Dean Hutchins
was instrumental in securing the transfer of Underhill Moore and
William 0. Douglas to the Yale Law faculty. Dean Hutchins also
recruited an impressive array of visiting professors: Morris Cohen of
the Department of Philosophy of the College of the City of New York,
who offered a course in jurisprudence; Harold J. Laski of the Uni-
versity of London, who taught a course in political and legal theory;
and Robert S. Foster of the Harvard Law School, who lectured on
insurance law.
In the classroom, Hutchins was popular and challenging. In the
1925-26 academic year, as Lecturer, he taught Public Service Law,
using Burdick's Cases on the Law of Public Service,7 and Trade Regu-
lation, using Oliphant's Cases on Trade Regulation.8 In the 1926-27
academic year, he taught Procedure II, using Hinton's Cases on the
Law of Code Pleading,9 and continued his course in Public Service
Law. In the 1927-28 academic year, while he was Acting Dean, he
taught a course in Evidence, using Hinton's Cases on the Law of Evi-
dence,10 and he continued this course the following year when he was
Dean and Professor.
Dean Hutchins' magnetic personality and intense interest in broad-
ening legal education resulted in significant additions to the endow-
ment funds of the Law School. During this time the Estate of John
W. Sterling gave the University a substantial endowment for the use
of the Law School, one-half of which was for the Sterling Chair to
be occupied by Professor Charles E. Clark and the other half for
additional Sterling fellowships." In view of the current cost of law
school education, it is interesting to note the following comment that
appears in Hutchins' annual report as Dean:
The new Sterling Chair will substantially reduce the present
deficit, which has been growing rapidly because of honors courses
and the additions to the staff and to the library that they have
made necessary. The increase of the tuition to $400 will tend in
the same direction. Each student now costs almost $1,000. There
is no good reason why the tuition charge should not eventually
approximate this figure, providing adequate scholarships can be
established. 12
7. C. BURDICK, CASES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC SERVICE (2d ed. 1924).
8. H. OLIPHANT, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1923).
9. E. HINTON, CASES ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1922).
10. E. HINTON, CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1919).
11. R. Hutchins, supra note 1, at 6.
12. Id.
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Dean Hutchins' meteor-like rise to Dean of the Yale Law School was
made possible and was nurtured by the unusual ferment in the intel-
lectual leadership of the school, sometimes referred to as the Realist
Movement, which had developed under the deanship of Thomas W.
Swan. In the years before Hutchins' appointment as Dean, the early
lead in this movement at the Law School was taken by figures such
as Arthur L. Corbin, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Wesley N. Hohfeld.
Their lines of thought were set forth in a Comment in the Yale Law
Journal:
The first of these [lines of thought] is that the rules of human
action that we know as law are constantly changing, that no sys-
tem of human justice is eternal, that law forms but a part of our
ever-changing social mores, and that it is the function of lawyers,
of jurists and of law schools to cause the statement and applica-
tion of our legal rules to be in harmony with the mores of the
present instead of those of an outgrown past. The second matter
upon which emphasis has been placed . . . has been the necessity
of a more exact terminology leading to a more accurate legal
analysis.' 3
Over and over again in classroom instruction, the theme was sounded
that the "Yale system" was formulated in reaction to the traditional
case method of instruction used at the Harvard Law School, in which,
it was alleged, too much importance was attributed to general legal
principles developed from appellate cases and not enough study was
given to the facts of each case in terms of the conditions and values
of contemporary society. As noted above, Dean Hutchins' particular
contribution was to stress the interrelationship of law and other so-
cial sciences. What was not apparent at the time Dean Hutchins left
the Law School, however, was that the movement toward a jurispru-
dence rooted in the social sciences tended to emphasize faculty re-
search, on an individual basis, at the expense of teaching excellence.
Yet there is no doubt that the writings and research activities of the
Law School faculty during this period had a lasting effect upon the
methods of teaching law throughout the United States. This phase
of the Law School's history came to a close in the 1930s, during the
Depression years, when the funds for legal research from private sources
dried up and the attention of many legal educators turned toward
political action as part of the New Deal movement in Washington.
13. Comment, Social Mores, Legal Analysis, and the Journal, 29 YALE L.J. 83, 83-84
(1919).
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Dean Hutchins brought to the Yale Law School a unique brand
of liberal humanism, a spirit of reform in law teaching, and an af-
finity for empirical legal research. When he left law teaching, he left
with the respect and admiration of the group of giants in legal edu-
cation who constituted the faculty of the Yale Law School during
those years. He also departed with the friendship and admiration of
the students who were both entertained and stimulated by his un-
orthodox teaching methods and by his ingrained belief that the law,
when appropriately integrated with the other social sciences, would
point the way toward major improvements in human behavior.
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